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FAMILY LAW: PARENT AND CHILD
by
Ellen K Solender*
E ACH year the volume of cases concerning parent and child increases.
This year was no exception, but the increase does not indicate any
change in the substantive law or any establishment of new rights or privi-
leges for either parent or child. The increase in litigation in this area is a
natural consequence of the higher divorce rate, since every divorce involv-
ing children contains the seeds for possible further litigation. The
problems concerning children who are at risk still trouble the courts, and it
is hoped that some resolution of the tensions between the rights of parents
versus those of their children will be made in the forthcoming year by the
United States Supreme Court, the Texas Supreme Court, or the Texas
Legislature.
I. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
In Quilloin v. Walcott' the Supreme Court continued its constitutional
analysis of the rights of fathers of illegitimate children that it began in
Stanley v. Illinois.2 In Stanley the Court held that a father of illegitimate
children "was entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before his
children were taken from him."3 Quilloin addressed the right of a father to
prevent the adoption of his illegitimate children even though he never had
and did not desire to have custody. Quilloin arose in Georgia as a steppar-
ent adoption proceeding in which the wife-mother had consented to her
husband's adoption of her child. Under Georgia law only the consent of
the mother is required for the adoption of an illegitimate child.' The natu-
ral father was notified of the adoption petition and counter-petitioned for
legitimation. The court held extensive hearings and found that adoption,
rather than legitimation, was in the best interests of the child. Under
Georgia law, therefore, the natural father could not block the adoption.
The natural father contended on appeal that since no finding had been
made that he was unfit as a father, he should have the same right to pre-
vent the adoption as is provided a legal father. Appellant asserted that he
was denied equal protection of the law because his interests were indistin-
* A.B., Oberlin College; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Associate Professor of
Law, Southern Methodist University.
1. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
2. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
3. Id. at 649.
4. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-403(3) (1973).
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guishable from those of a married father who is either separated or di-
vorced from the mother and is no longer living with his child. The Court
distinguished married and unmarried fathers on the facts of this case, not-
ing that the unmarried father had never exercised actual or legal custody
over his child and had never shouldered any significant responsibility with
respect to daily supervision or care of the child.' The Court appears to
have established a presumption that during marriage a father "will have
borne full responsibility for the rearing of his children."6 This presump-
tion of responsibility is consistent with differences in dependency presump-
tions permitted between legitimate and illegitimate children in social
security cases.' Quilloin may be seen, however, as signaling the narrowing
of the scope of protection afforded illegitimates and their parents from the
apparent widening in Trimble v. Gordon.8
The Court pointed out this term in La//i v. Lalh// that the standard for
determining whether or not there has been a violation of equal protection
for illegitimates has not been one of "strict scrutiny," but rather one of a
rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. On the surface the facts
in Lai appear to be the same as those in Trimble, except that Lalli con-
cerns a New York statute and Trimble an Illinois statute. The facts of the
cases are distinguishable, however, since the father in Trimble had gone
through a court paternity proceeding prior to death, whereas the father in
La//i had not. Despite the paternity finding in Trimble, the Illinois intes-
tate succession statute precluded any recovery for the illegitimate child be-
cause the parents had not married each other prior to the death of the
father. New York, on the other hand, does not require marriage as a pre-
requisite to intestate succession; it requires only a court adjudication of
paternity during the father's lifetime.' 0 New York's argument for a find-
ing of a rational relationship between the requirement of a court proceed-
ing during a father's lifetime and a determination of heirship was based
primarily on administrative exigency, in that the method prescribed by its
statute is intended to provide an orderly distribution of estates. In Trim-
ble, on the other hand, Illinois related its law only to an interest in encour-
aging legitimate family relationships. The Court in Lalli found New
York's argument persuasive, and held that, in equal protection decisions
relating to illegitimates, the standard to be used is one in which a substan-
5. The question of support was not raised since the mother had not requested it and
apparently the father had not offered it.
6. 434 U.S. at 256.
7. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
8. 430 U.S. 762 (1977). See also Solender, Family Law.' Parent and Child, Annual Sur-
vey of Texas Law, 32 Sw. L.J. 141, 144 (1978).
9. 47 U.S.L.W. 4061 (U.S. Dec. II, 1978).
10. N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2(a)(2) (McKinney 1967) provides:
An illegitimate child is the legitimate child of his father so that he and his
issue inherit from his father if a court of competent jurisdiction has, during the
lifetime of the father, made an order of filiation declaring paternity in a pro-
ceeding instituted during the pregnancy of the mother or within two years
from the birth of the child.
The statute of limitations issue, which is implicit in this statute, was not raised or discussed.
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tial state interest is promoted by a procedure related to that interest in a
manner not "so tenuous that it lacks the rationality contemplated by the
fourteenth amendment.""
The decision in Lalli was essentially a five-to-four decision, with Mr.
Justice Powell, who wrote the Court opinion in both Trimble and Laili, the
swing Justice. Justice Blackmun, noting in his concurrence in La//i'2 that
the facts of La/i and Trimble were indistinguishable, urged that Trimble
be overruled. He concurred, nonetheless, because the Court was returning
to the principles established in Labine v. Vincent. 3 Labine held, essen-
tially, that so long as there is no total exclusion of illegitimates from the
possibility of heirship, the several states are free to determine their own
procedures for intestate succession.' 4
The Court's continued high regard for marriage is underscored by its
decision in Zab/ocki v. Redhail, 5 which struck down as a denial of equal
protection a Wisconsin statute that denied the right to marry to persons
who owed child support payments. 16 The case was brought by a young
man who had been found to be the natural father of an illegitimate child
and ordered to pay child support by a Wisconsin court. Approximately
two years after the order he applied for a marriage license, which was de-
nied because he had not obtained a court order granting him permission to
marry. The parties to the action stipulated that the father would not have
been able to obtain the necessary court order because he was in arrears on
his child support obligation and that the child had been a public charge
since birth. The father's situation, however, was urgent in that he and the
woman he intended to marry were expecting a child and they wanted to be
lawfully married before the date of the expected birth. The Court found
the statute unconstitutional, holding that the right to marry is a fundamen-
tal right, and a state may not interfere with the exercise of a fundamental
right unless that interference will effectuate an important state interest.
While realizing that the state's interest in the support of children is a legiti-
mate and substantial interest, the Court questioned the means of effectuat-
ing that interest and found that limiting marriage was an underinclusive
method for preventing the incurrence of new support obligations.
The fact that the support of children is a substantial state interest, but
not a fundamental right, was further underscored in Kulko v. Superior
I1. 47 U.S.L.W. at 4064.
12. Id. at 4065.
13. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
14. See Robertson v. Wegmann, 434 U.S. 983 (1978), which further expounds the
Court's policy of letting the several states determine their own probate procedures.
15. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
16. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 245.10(1) (West Supp. 1978-79) provides:
No Wisconsin resident having minor issue not in his custody and which he is
under obligation to support by any court or judgment, may marry in this state
or elsewhere, without the order of. . .the court of this state which granted
such judgment or support order . . . .No marriage license shall be issued to
any such person except upon court order.
1979]
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Court,7 in which the Court held that California offended traditional no-
tions of fair play and substantial justice 8 by asserting in personam juris-
diction over a father who had done no more than permit his children to
reside in California with their mother. The couple established their mari-
tal domicile in New York, executed a separation agreement in New York,
and procured a divorce in Haiti under a decree that incorporated the terms
of the separation agreement. The mother then moved to California where
she remarried.
Under the terms of the agreement the children were to reside with their
father during the school year, and were to visit with their mother during
Christmas, Easter, and summer vacations. The father was obligated to pay
$3,000 per year in child support for the periods of time the children spent
with their mother, but had no obligation to support the mother. Subse-
quently, the daughter told her father that she wanted to reside perma-
nently with her mother and the father bought her a one-way ticket to
California. The daughter reversed the agreed visitation agreement by
spending the school year with her mother and vacations with her father.
Three years later the son, unknown to his father, expressed to his mother
the desire to live with her in California, and she sent him a plane ticket.
Less than a month after the son arrived in California the mother com-
menced an action against the father in the California courts, seeking to
establish the Haitian divorce decree as a California judgment and to mod-
ify the decree as to custody and support. The father appeared specially
and moved to quash the service of process on the ground that he was not a
resident of California and lacked sufficient "minimum contacts" 9 with the
state to warrant the state's assertion of personal jurisdiction.
Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, found that the father, by merely
buying his daughter a ticket to California, had not purposefully availed
himself of the benefits and protections of California law so as to confer
personal jurisdiction over him.2" The Court noted a distinction between
family relations and commercial activity or tortious conduct, apparently
requiring a lower standard of minimum contacts in commercial or tort
cases than in domestic relations cases.2' The Court pointed out that be-
17. 436 U.S. 84 (1978), discussed in Weintraub, Texas Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Family
Law Cases, 32 Sw. L.J. 965, 979 (1978).
18. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milli-
ken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
19. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
20. 436 U.S. at 94 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). Three Justices
dissented in Kulko, stating that the determination of what constitutes fair play and substan-
tial justice under the International Shoe test is not a black and white issue. Consequently,
they would have found that the father's contacts with California were not too attenuated.
436 U.S. at 90-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
21. Id. at 96-97. The Court rejected the California Supreme Court's holding that the
father's actions caused a sufficient "effect" in California to warrant the exercise of in per-
sonam jurisdiction. Noting that the "effects test" is intended to apply to wrongful activity
outside the forum state causing injury within the forum or commercial activity affecting the
forum's residents, Justice Marshall found that assertion of in personam jurisdiction in this
instance would be unreasonable.
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cause both California and New York have enacted some form of the Uni-
form Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act,22 the mother had an avenue
for redress, notwithstanding the unavailability of jurisdiction in the Cali-
fornia courts.
The case is significant because it establishes some limit on the reach of
the Texas Family Code long-arm provision.23 While California does not
have a specific parent-child related long-arm statute, it does have a general
statute that is intended to extend as far as the United States Constitution
will permit.24 Although the Texas parent-child long-arm statute has a sim-
ilar provision,25 it also contains specific language that appears to provide
for jurisdiction based on facts similar to the facts on which the exercise of
jurisdiction was found unconstitutional in Kulko.26 Notably, the lack of a
specific statutory basis for jurisdiction did not appear to be a factor in
Kulko.
II. STATUS
Status as a tuition-free student in Texas public schools is granted to
school age children who are citizens or legally admitted aliens.27 Illegal
alien children, however, are not accorded this right, although many school
districts permit them to attend school upon the payment of tuition. In Her-
nandez v. Houston Independent School District28 the court addressed the
constitutionality of denying a tuition-free education to illegal aliens. Rely-
ing on San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,2 9 the court
held that the denial of a free education is not a denial of a fundamental
right, and therefore, a system that distinguishes between legal and illegal
residents need not be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.3" The constitu-
tional test, therefore, is whether a rational relationship exists between the
state action in denying certain rights and furthering a legitimate state pur-
22. California has enacted the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act of 1968
as CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. §§ 1650-1697 (West 1972 & Supp. 1978). New York has enacted
the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act of 1950 as N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW§§ 30-43 (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1978).
23. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.051 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
24, "A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the
Constitution of this state or of the United States." CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 410.10 (West
1973).
25. A Texas court may exercise in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident or nondom-
iciliary of Texas if "there is any basis consistent with the constitutions of this state or the
United States for the exercise of personal jurisdiction." TEX. FAM. CODE Ann. § 11.051(4)
(Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
26. A Texas court may exercise in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident or nondom-
iciliary of Texas if "the child resides in this state ... as a result of the acts or directives or
with the approval of the person on whom service is required." Id. § 11.051(2) (emphasis
added).
27. TEX. EDUC. CODE § 21.031 (Vernon 1972).
28. 558 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
29. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
30. Although classifications based on alienage are per se suspect and subject to strict
judicial scrutiny, the court in Hernandez found that TEX. EDUC. CODE § 21.031 (Vernon
1972) does not concern alienage, "but instead [deals] with a class based upon residence
within the United States in violation of the law." 558 S.W.2d at 124.
1979]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JO URNAL
pose.3' Noting that the revenue available for public education is limited,
the court in Hernandez determined that the Texas statute denying free ed-
ucation to illegal aliens represented a rational means of funding public
education.32
The representation of a minor in a tort action was addressed in Coleman
v. Donaho,33 in which the defendants objected to the appointment of a
guardian ad litem and the subsequent assessment of his fees against the
defendants. The court pointed out that since both the minor and his par-
ents were parties to the lawsuit, a conflict of interest could have arisen.
Consequently, appointing a guardian ad litem and assessing his fees to the
defendants was proper. In Rexroat v. Prescot134 a different aspect of minor
representation was addressed. A minor who was injured in an automobile
accident brought an action against two defendants, alleging joint and sev-
eral liability. Pursuant to rule 44 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure,35
the minor, represented by a "next friend," entered a settlement with one
defendant. The nonsettling defendant claimed that the settlement acted as
a bar to the present action. The nonsettling defendant relied upon the lan-
guage of rule 44, which precludes settlement without court approval and
mandates that the settlement "shall be forever binding and conclusive
upon the party plaintiff."36 The court held, however, that a rule 44 settle-
ment is governed by the holding in McMillen v. Klingensmith,37 which
states that a contractual release or settlement discharges only the parties
named in the settlement. To hold otherwise would prevent a minor from
settling with any of the parties in a multiparty lawsuit for less than full
satisfaction of his claim.
The family purpose doctrine 38 was resurrected in de Anda v. Blake,39 in
which a minor was involved in a collision while driving her mother's unin-
sured automobile. The mother-daughter relationship was found to be one
of principal and agent, since the daughter was driving the car with her
mother's consent for the purpose of buying shoes for another minor mem-
ber of the family. Thus, the mother was found liable for her daughter's
negligence. The mother filed a cross-action against her estranged husband,
the minor's father, contending that he was jointly and severally liable, but
31. In Rodriguez the Supreme Court upheld as constitutional Texas's method of school
financing, which permits each school district to supplement state funding through an ad
valorem tax on property within its jurisdiction. The Court found that the Texas financing
scheme was a rational method of allocating economic resources. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
32. The court noted that the cost of educating the 5,000 illegal aliens in Houston could
be as much as $8,350,000 a year, and found that TEX. EDUC. CODE § 21.031 (VERNON 1972)
insured that citizens and legally admitted aliens would receive a certain quality of education.
558 S.W.2d at 125. The court also noted that a federal district court had held otherwise, but
since it was an unpublished opinion refused to give it any weight. Id. at 124.
33. 559 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ granted).
34. 570 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
35. TEX. R. Civ. P. 44.
36. Id.
37. 467 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. 1971).
38. See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 483 (4th ed. 1971).
39. 562 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, no writ).
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the cross-action was not specifically addressed in the judgment. The ap-
pellate court, however, concluded that the cross-action was conclusively
tried and disposed of by implied consent. Further, the court found that
although the Family Code makes community property subject to tortious
liability incurred by either spouse,4" a plaintiff need not seek recovery
from both spouses, and a judgment need not be entered jointly and sever-
ally against a married couple, unless both spouses were actually involved
and therefore both personally liable. Under the facts of this case, the hus-
band was not in a principal-agent relationship to either his daughter or his
wife and was not personally liable.
One of the most important aspects of establishing the identity as well as
the status of a child is paternity. Once the paternity of a father is litigated
and a final judgment is rendered, the issue is res judicata even though the
issue was not specifically argued in the suit for divorce.4 Prior to the 1973
decision of Gomez v. Perez42 a paternity suit could not be brought in
Texas, since the obligation of a father to support an illegitimate child was
not recognized. In 1975 the Texas Family Code was amended to provide
for paternity suits,43 but section 13.01 contains a provision barring any
such suit brought after the child has reached the age of one year.44 In
cases in which the limitation provision has been raised the Texas courts
have held that this provision may not be applied retroactively.45
The constitutionality of the paternity suit limitation provision was sus-
tained in Texas Department of Human Resources v. Chapman.46 Chapman
may be described as a pro forma decision in that the denial of equal pro-
tection contention was rejected because a rational relationship exists be-
tween the prevention of fraudulent claims and a time limitation. Noting
that illegitimacy is not a suspect classification,47 the court in Chapman held
there is no denial of equal protection as long as the statute does not abso-
lutely foreclose the right of child support. In response to the contention by
the Department of Human Resources that the statute denies illegitimate
children due process of law, the court concluded that the legislature could
reasonably have decided that the support right of a child is best protected
by his mother, and on balance the protection of men from fraudulent and
stale claims is more important than giving illegitimate children a method
40. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.61(d) (Vernon 1975).
41. See Walters v. Walters, 565 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978, no writ).
42. 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
43. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 13.01-.09 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
44. "A suit to establish the parent-child relationship between a child who is not the
legitimate child of a man and the child's natural father by proof of paternity must be
brought before the child is one year old, or the suit is barred." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.01
(Vernon Supp. 1978-79) (emphasis added).
45. State Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Martin, 562 S.W.2d 9 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1978, no writ); Catchings v. Hamm, 560 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977, no writ).
See also Solender, supra note 8, at 149.
46. 570 S.W.2d 46 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ ref d n.r.e.).
47. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505-10 (1976), holding that illegitimacy is a classi-
fication calling for less than strict scrutiny.
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for remedying their mother's inaction."
The constitutionality of section 13.01 of the Family Code may not be
settled, however, since the United States Supreme Court has not consid-
ered the effect of time limitations on establishing inheritance rights of ille-
gitimates. The Court noted in La//i v. Lal "49 that accuracy is enhanced by
adjudicating paternity disputes during the lifetime of the alleged father;
the statute of limitations question was not raised, however, and the Court
did not address the issue.
The Texas paternity statute was subjected to further constitutional scru-
tiny in In re B.M.N. ' In that case the court, as provided by statute, or-
dered blood tests to establish the possibility of paternity,5 and found that
the tests showed by clear and convincing evidence that the alleged father
was excluded from the possibility of being the natural father of the child,
and dismissed the suit with prejudice. The appellant claimed that the stat-
utory requirement for dismissal based solely on blood tests52 is a violation
of due process as required by the Texas Constitution. 3 After a lengthy
and careful discussion of the constitutional questions, the court concluded
that the statutory reliance on blood tests to disprove paternity is neither
arbitrary nor unreasonable. The court found that "the legislature has de-
termined that blood tests are the most accurate methods yet devised . . . to
determine the lack of paternity of an alleged father."54 Further, the court
held that using blood tests as evidence for determining paternity was
within the guidelines suggested by the United States Supreme Court in
Trimble v. Gordon.15
Trimble was also relied on in Lovejoy v. Lillie,5 6 a suit to determine heir-
ship in which the court found that the three illegitimate children of the
male decedent were entitled to inherit despite section 42 of the Texas Pro-
bate Code, which grants only maternal inheritance rights to illegitimate
children. 7 Apparently, the decedent had not attempted legitimation, but
the trial court found that the children were the biological children of the
decedent. The appellate court held this finding sufficient to establish heir-
ship. Although neither the sufficiency of the evidence nor the method of
determining the biological relationship was discussed, the court neverthe-
48. 570 S.W.2d at 50.
49. 47 U.S.L.W. 4061 (U.S. Dec. 11, 1978). See also notes 9-14 supra and accompany-
ing text.
50. 570 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
51. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 13.03-.05 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
52. "At the conclusion of the pretrial conference, if the court finds that the tests show by
clear and convincing evidence that the alleged father is not the father of the child, the court
shall dismiss the suit with prejudice." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.05(a) (Vernon Supp.
1978-79).
53. The appellant cited TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 13, but the court also discussed id. art. I,
§§ 3 & 19, as well as U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
54. 570 S.W.2d at 501.
55. 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
56. 569 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
57. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79). See Solender, supra note 8,
at 144-46.
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less held that since the determination of paternity had been made, the chil-
dren must be treated as the legitimate children of their father for intestate
succession purposes, just as they would have been treated had their
mother's estate been in question. The court thus struck down section 42 of
the Texas Probate Code as unconstitutional. 5
In Griffith v. Christian59 the right of children to receive workers' compen-
sation benefits upon the death of their natural father when they have been
adopted by another prior to the natural father's death was litigated again
this year. The appellate court, following the rule of Patton v.
Shamburger,6° held that these children do not qualify for such benefits
because they are not minor children of the deceased under the workers'
compensation statute.6 The court did not find any equal protection viola-
tion, since the children have the adoptive parent's benefits to rely on
should the need arise. The confusion concerning workers' compensation
benefits may lie in the old adoption statute, under which children were
entitled to inherit from their natural parents even after their adoption.62
This rule is still true under the new statute, unless specifically decreed
otherwise.63 Intestate succession, however, is not the same as workers'
compensation benefits, and so the results are different.
In Moran v. Adler6 4 the Texas Supreme Court held that the standard of
proof required to establish an equitable adoption is preponderance of the
evidence, not the "clear, unequivocal and convincing" standard. The
court further held that the reason an innocent purchaser is protected
against the claims of an equitably adopted child is the policy protecting
innocent purchasers against secret titles, not a rule that a legal title cuts off
an equitable title. The court stated that "a purchaser from an apparent
legal heir, in the absence of notice to the contrary, can rely upon the pre-
sumption that there are no equitably adopted children."65 The rationale is
obvious in that there are no records of equitable adoptions to put an inno-
cent purchaser on notice of an outstanding claim.
The attorney general issued an opinion that should clear up some of the
problems parents have in connection with names and status recorded by
hospitals on their children's birth certificates.66 The opinion stated that no
claim concerning the status of legitimacy or illegitimacy should appear on
58. 569 S.W.2d at 503. The court in Lovejoy was unable to distinguish § 42 of the Texas
Probate Code from the provision in the Illinois Probate Act that was declared unconstitu-
tional in Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977). Both statutes permitted an illegitimate to
inherit from his mother only. But see note 8-14 supra and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the possible limitations on Trimble.
59. 564 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, no writ).
60. 431 S.W.2d 506 (Tex. 1968). See Solender, Family Law. Parent and Child, Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 31 Sw. L.J. 133, 137 (1977).
61. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 8a (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
62. 1931 TEX. GEN. LAWS ch. 177, § I1, at 300 (formerly TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 46a,§ 9).
63. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.07 (Vernon 1975).
64. 570 S.W.2d 883 (Tex. 1978).
65. Id. at 887.
66. TEX. Arr'v GEN. Op. No. H-1078 (1977).
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the certificate. Further, since Texas does not regulate the naming of chil-
dren, a child's surname may be any name that the parents wish the child to
have. In a situation in which paternity is disputed, a name should not be
used that would tend to identify the alleged father. The opinion, without
attempting to define "tend to identify," stated that in some situations use
of the alleged father's surname would be permissible. The hospital admin-
istrator must make a judgment in each case.
III. CONSERVATORSHIP
The courts generally become involved in the question of conservatorship
in three different situations. Initially courts are required to intervene at the
time of divorce either to settle disputed questions of managing and posses-
sory conservatorship or to approve the agreements of the parties. After a
divorce decree is granted, the parties often wish to change the arrange-
ments made under the decree. The courts may then become involved
when one party decides to change conservatorship without benefit of legal
action. This situation usually comes before the court in the form of a writ
of habeas corpus.67 The third situation giving rise to court intervention is
when one party wishes to change a prior court order through legal chan-
nels by way of a suit for modification.6"
Although not within the foregoing categories, Texas courts were con-
cerned in the last year with the constitutional validity of the Texas Child
Care Licensing Act.69 The issue raised by this Act is essentially one of
custody because parents who are managing conservators have a right to
place their children in schools or camps when the parents believe it is ben-
eficial for their children.7" In two cases decided during the survey period,
an unlicensed religion-based home for juvenile delinquents challenged the
constitutionality of the Texas Child Care Licensing Act. In RoloffEvangel-
istic Enterprises, Inc. v. State7 the court did not resolve the appellants'
contention that the Act infringed upon their free exercise of religion be-
cause the facts before the court did not illustrate a conflict between the
appellants' religious beliefs and the provisions of the Act. In Oxford v.
Hill,72 however, the court upheld the constitutionality of the Act, finding
that the Act is a reasonable regulation of conduct rather than an abridge-
67. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.10 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
68. Id. § 14.08.
69. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 695a-3 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
70. The right of parents to unilaterally place their children in mental institutions has
been challenged recently. E.g., Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd
on other grounds, 431 U.S. 119 (1977). This issue is currently before the United States
Supreme Court. Secretary of Pub. Welfare v. Institutionalized Juveniles, 459 F. Supp. 30
(E.D. Pa.),prob.juris. noted, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1132, 98 S. Ct. 3087 (1978); J.L. v. Parham, 412 F.
Supp. 112 (M.D. Ga. 1976), prob. juris noted, 431 U.S. 936 (1977). Oral argument was
heard in both cases on Oct. 10, 1978. 47 U.S.L.W. 3263 (1978). The right of parents to
decide the education of their children, however, has been sustained previously. Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
71. 556 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.), appealdismissed, 47
U.S.L.W. 3220 (U.S. Oct. 2, 1978).
72. 558 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd).
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ment of freedom of religious belief. Thus, conduct based on religious be-
liefs, rather than the beliefs themselves, are "'subject to regulation for the
protection of society.' ,
73
Appellate courts are reluctant to overturn trial court custody decisions,
but trial court decisions must be based on proper jurisdiction. In Fox v.
FOX,74 a suit for divorce brought by the husband, the trial court did not
have in personam jurisdiction over his wife and children. The husband
was serving in the army at Fort Hood, Texas, but his wife and children
were residents and domiciliaries of Ohio. The appeals court concluded
that although the wife had been served personally,75 she had insufficient
contacts with Texas to permit in personam jurisdiction. The court, how-
ever, had jurisdiction to order the husband, who was before the court, to
make child support payments, and because divorce is a question of sta-
tus, 76 the court had jurisdiction to grant an ex parte divorce. Resolution of
the custody question in this case must wait until some court has jurisdic-
tion over all the parties.
Venue is an important issue for Texans who live in different counties,
and has led to much litigation. 77 Divorce jurisdiction generally attaches to
the trial court in which a divorce suit is first properly filed. If the parties
are parents of minor children, a suit affecting the parent-child relationship
must be included in the suit for divorce.78 If another court has continuing
jurisdiction of the minor children, then upon motion of one of the parties,
that court must transfer the suit to the court with divorce jurisdiction.79 In
Brown v. Brown8" the husband-father filed a suit for divorce and for deter-
mination of conservatorship in Matagorda County, Texas. His wife re-
sponded with a plea of privilege claiming that she and her daughter were
residents of Harris County, and, therefore, venue should be in Harris
County. She failed to allege and prove, as required, that she had filed for a
divorce in Harris County prior to the filing of the Matagorda County ac-
tion, so the appellate court dismissed the appeal. The court pointed out
that the wife had followed the wrong transfer procedure. The proper pro-
cedure under the Family Code is to file a motion to transfer rather than a
plea of privilege, but even if the court had treated the wife's plea of privi-
lege as a motion to transfer, such a motion being nonappealable, she
would still have lost.8 The wife's only possible remedy might have been
73. Id. at 559 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940)).
74. 559 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ).
75. The wife was served personally pursuant to TEX. R. Civ. P. 108, which may be
construed as a long-arm statute by which in personam jurisdiction may be obtained. 559
S.W.2d at 409. Rule 108, like the Texas general long-arm statute, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964), permits assertion of personal jurisdiction to the limits of due
process. See U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. 1977).
76. Cleveland v. Ward, 116 Tex. I, 285 S.W. 1063 (1926).
77. See Koons, Jurisdiction, Venue, and Transfers in Suits Affecting the Parent-Child Re-
lationshiv (Where All Parties Reside in Texas), 9 TEX. TECH L. REV. 243 (1978).
78. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.55(b) (Vernon 1975).
79. Id. § 11.06(b).
80. 566 S.W.2d 378 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no writ).
81. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.06(f) (Vernon 1975).
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by way of a petition for writ of mandamus.
When two states and two Texas courts become involved in a divorce and
custody suit, the result is confusion, litigation, and little discussion of the
merits. Such was the case in Expare Jabara,82 in which the husband-
relator had been ordered jailed by a Texas juvenile court judge for failing
to produce his two children in juvenile court in response to his wife's appli-
cation for writ of habeas corpus. The wife's request for habeas corpus and
custody was based upon a temporary order of a Virginia court giving her
custody of the children. Although the father should have filed a plea in
abatement, he filed a motion to quash the writ of habeas corpus and asked
for custody of their children on grounds that a divorce suit was pending in
a Texas domestic relations court and that court had issued a temporary
order granting custody to the husband-relator. The appellate court held
that the juvenile court had no jurisdiction to proceed because of the pend-
ing action in the domestic relations court. The court, however, did not
settle the real issue in the case, which is whether the Virginia court is the
court of dominant jurisdiction, in which case its orders would be entitled
to full faith and credit. The appellate court referred this matter to the
domestic relations court for its decision.
Geesbreght v. Geesbreghts3 also posed jurisdictional questions, but the
actions of the appellant-wife rendered those questions moot. The wife left
her husband and took their children to Illinois where she immediately filed
a suit for separate maintenance and custody of the children. About a
month later, the husband filed a suit for divorce in Tarrant County. In
August the Illinois court dismissed its suit for lack of prosecution, which
suit was later reinstated, and the wife appeared in Tarrant County at a
hearing in connection with her plea to be appointed temporary managing
conservator of the children. The trial court sitting with a jury found that
the husband should be appointed managing conservator. The wife ap-
pealed, contending that the court did not have jurisdiction to determine
custody of the children because they were outside the state. The husband
filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the appellant had
not complied with the trial court judgment since she had continued to keep
the children in Illinois. Prior to the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the
appellant delivered the children to her husband in Tarrant County. After
ruling that the wife waived all challenges to jurisdiction by appearing gen-
erally to request temporary custody, the court in obiter dictum held that
the trial court had jurisdiction in any event because the domicile of the
children remained in Texas. The court based this conclusion on the fa-
ther's lack of knowledge of or consent to any change in domicile, his con-
tinued support of the children at all times, and Family Code provisions
giving a parent a right to decide domicile. The court, because the jurisdic-
tional questions had become moot, did not have to decide which of the two
82. 556 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ).
83. 570 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, no writ).
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parents with differing domiciles has the greater power to settle the domicile
of their children.
The wide discretion of trial courts in adjudicating custody matters was
sustained in a series of cases giving custody to grandparents, 84 to the fa-
ther,85 and to the mother.86 In In re Marriage of Slocke1 87 the appellate
court sustained the trial court's refusal to interview a five-year-old child
concerning her choice of managing conservator. The judge did not want
the child "thinking consciously or subconsciously that she had contributed
to the decision of which parent was appointed her managing conserva-
tor."88 In Kates v. Smith,8 9 however, a rather complex legitimation and
custody case was reversed and remanded because the trial court considered
a supplemental report that was made to the court after the close of the
custody hearing. The appellate court found that this procedure violated
the Family Code, which mandates that the parties have an opportunity to
examine anyone making an investigation or report that is considered by
the court in making a decision on matters pertaining to the parent-child
relationship.9"
In Walsh v. Walsh9 the appointment of the mother as managing conser-
vator was rendered moot by her death subsequent to the divorce decree.
The surviving parent automatically became the managing conservator.
Death does not, however, solve all problems. In Barrientos v. Garza,92 af-
ter the death of the mother, the father remarried and the maternal grand-
mother sought court ordered access and visitation rights. The trial court's
decree granting these rights was reversed by the appellate court on grounds
that the statutory provision for access rights for grandparents applies only
when a managing conservator has been appointed.93 The court pointed
out that this decision appeared to conflict with the holding in Goolsbee v.
Heft, 94 but noted that the Goolsbee court was confronted with a different
fact situation and had not considered the full implications of section 14.03
of the Family Code. The Barrientos court appears to view the provisions
on grandparents as limitations on the courts' power, rather than as expres-
sions of legislative policy towards a broader recognition of grandparents'
interests.95 This interpretation leads to an anomalous situation where a
stepparent with little interest in the stepchildren has a greater right to ex-
84. Owen v. Owen, 558 S.W.2d 63 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977, writ dism'd).
85. Brinkman v. Brinkman, 558 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1977, writ dism'd).
86. In re Marriage of Stockett, 570 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1978, no
writ).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 153.
89. 556 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977, no writ).
90. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.14 (Vernon 1975).
91. 562 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, no writ).
92. 559 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ).
93. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.03 (Vernon 1975).
94. 549 S.W.2d 34 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, no writ).
95. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 14.03(d), 16.09(d) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79) (amend-
ing the original Family Code). See also Solender, supra note 8, at 14[-42.
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clude the natural grandparents than a stepparent who has evidenced such
concern that he has gone through an adoption proceeding. Adoption re-
quires court intervention and would therefore create a forum for the
grandparents to demand visitation rights.
Once the managing conservator has been appointed by the court, the
losing party may attempt self-help methods of altering the decision by ei-
ther retaining the child longer than the lawful visitation period or by re-
moving the child from the possession of the managing conservator. The
lawful managing conservator must then return to court to maintain his or
her right to possession of the child. When the managing conservator ap-
plies to the court for a writ of habeas corpus in accordance with the provi-
sions of the Family Code,96 the trial court too often permits the other party
to amend the action to one for modification. To quash the modification
action the managing conservator must then petition the Texas Supreme
Court for a writ of mandamus ordering the trial judge to grant the writ of
habeas corpus. Over the past several years the Texas Supreme Court has
granted these writs almost routinely.9' While the trial judges are at fault
for not following the law, the attorneys who help their clients file improper
modification actions are also at fault and should perhaps be required to
pay all costs of bringing the mandamus actions.
The status of parties pending appeal is that of the trial court's judgment
unless the judgment has been specifically suspended. Apparently there can
be confusion concerning which judgment is meant by a court and this was
the excuse given by the offending parties in Ex parte Rutherford.9 8 The
father had been made managing conservator of the children in the original
suit; however, in a modification suit the mother was named managing con-
servator and the father appealed. The civil appeals court reversed and re-
manded, but restored the parties to their status under the trial court's
decree.9 9 This had the effect of making the mother the managing conser-
vator, but the father refused to give up custody of the children since he had
appealed to the Texas Supreme Court. The trial court found the father
and his attorney in contempt and they filed for a writ of habeas corpus in a
different civil appeals court. " That court granted the father's writ, but
not the attorney's because the attorney had not violated a custody order
and the court of criminal appeals is the only Texas appellate court with
general jurisdiction of writs of habeas corpus. Meanwhile the wife had
been granted a writ of attachment for the children by the original trial
court, so the husband went back to the second court and filed for a writ of
prohibition, whereupon the second court decided that really it did not have
96. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.10 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
97. Strobel v. Thurman, 565 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. 1978); Trader v. Dear, 565 S.W.2d 233
(Tex. 1978); Saucier v. Pena, 559 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. 1978). See also Solender, supra note 8, at
143; Solender, supra note 60, at 138.
98. 556 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, no writ).
99. Taft v. Johnson, 553 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
100. Exparte Rutherford, 556 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, no writ).
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jurisdiction after all and refused to grant the writ. 101
Trial courts do enforce custody orders and, in appropriate circum-
stances, foreign judgments by habeas corpus.' °2 At times courts may be-
come autocratic about acts that they perceive to flaunt their authority and
may unnecessarily hold in contempt parties who are attempting to act in
good faith.' °3 The courts' attempts to enforce custody are sometimes de-
feated by parties who flee the jurisdiction, although these parties are then
denied the right of appeal. 4 Unless the situation falls within guidelines
established by the legislature, habeas corpus will not lie. In Beverly v. Bev-
erly' 5 the mother had originally been awarded custody of the child pursu-
ant to an Alabama divorce. About a year later the father took possession
of the child at the mother's request. The child remained in the custody of
the father for a period of approximately two-and-one-half years, except for
occasional short visits with the mother. The mother filed suit in Alabama
alleging delinquent support payments and other matters relating to cus-
tody, whereupon the father filed suit in Texas seeking modification of the
Alabama divorce judgment so as to make him the managing conservator.
The Texas court named the father temporary managing conservator, and
the mother then sought a writ of habeas corpus asserting her rights to pos-
session of the child. The court denied the writ because the child had been
in the father's possession for over six months prior to the filing of the ap-
plication for the writ.' 0 6 The mother contended that this was error because
during that period she had possession of the child for eight days during a
Christmas holiday visit. The appeals court affirmed the trial court's denial
of the writ, holding that the eight-day interruption of possession was "so
brief as to be insignificant."' 7
Jurisdiction in suits for custody modification are subject to the same
constitutional requirements of "fair play and substantial justice"' 8 as are
original suits for custody.'0 9 In Corliss v. Smitht l a husband sought a
change in visitation rights that had been granted in a 1972 divorce decree;
the wife, however, had moved to Nebraska with the children three years
previously, and neither she nor the children were Texas domiciliaries. The
101. See Taft v. Schraub, 557 S.W.2d 172 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, no writ).
102. See Kellogg v. Kellogg, 559 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977, no writ)
(Connecticut custody order enforced by Texas court through habeas corpus provisions of
Family Code; see note 96 supra).
103. See, e.g., Exparte Minks, 563 S.W.2d 317 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, no
writ) (wife found in contempt for failure to produce children as ordered, although she could
show she had no power to comply). It is important to note that contempt will lie only if
based on a violation of a clear, specific, and unambiguous decree. Ex parte Dirr, 564
S.W.2d 422 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, no writ).
104. See, e.g., Griffin v. Stanley, 562 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, no writ).
105. 567 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, writ dism'd).
106. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.10(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
107. 567 S.W.2d at 621 (quoting Lamphere v. Chrisman, 554 S.W.2d 935, 938 (Tex.
1977)).
108. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
109. See text accompanying notes 75-76 supra, discussing Fox v. Fox, 559 S.W.2d 407
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ).
110. 560 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, no writ).
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wife appeared specially to contest the jurisdiction of the Texas court. The
trial court agreed with the wife and dismissed the suit. The Tyler court of
civil appeals affirmed, pointing out that although the literal requirements
of the Texas Family Code long-arm statute" Iappeared to be satisfied,
other factors militated against assertion of jurisdiction. First, because the
children had been domiciliaries of Nebraska for more than six months,
most witnesses who could testify as to the welfare and best interest of the
children were located in Nebraska. Thus, due process would not be served
by insisting on a trial in Texas. Second, since Nebraska would not give
full faith and credit to a Texas decree rendered in this case, the entire
question could be relitigated in Nebraska. 1 2
Although the continuing jurisdiction provisions of the Family Code", 3
appear to be clearly written, difficulties occasionally arise when parties
wish to modify decrees rendered prior to January 1, 1974. Any court ob-
taining jurisdiction after January 1, 1974, in a modification proceeding of a
pre-1974 decree retains jurisdiction.' '4 Exclusive continuing jurisdiction
attaches when a modification petition is filed if no other court has obtained
jurisdiction after January 1, 1974, and actions filed later in another state
will not oust the jurisdiction of the Texas court.' A corrective statement
by the State Department of Public Welfare can clear up confusion created
by a report stating erroneously that no court has continuing jurisdiction. If
a hearing has not been held, the court that has been misled should imme-
diately transfer the cause to the court with continuing jurisdiction, since
the court that mistakenly set the hearing originally no longer has jurisdic-
tion.'6 If a hearing is held and one of the parties protests, a transfer
would still seem to be in order.
Trial court decisions in custody matters are given great weight and are
generally sustained.' '7 In Watts v. Watts," ' however, the appellate court
found that the trial court had abused its discretion in ordering a change in
custody because no change of circumstance on the part of the managing
conservator was shown as required by section 14.08 of the Texas Family
Code." 9 Additionally, the trial court was reprimanded because it had
based visitation rights on a requirement that the children be taken to Sun-
I11. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.051 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
112. See Copple v. Copple, 186 Neb. 696, 185 N.W.2d 846 (1971).
113. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.05 (Vernon 1975).
114. See Baker v. Seaver, 567 S.W.2d 854 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1978, no writ).
115. See Varnon v. Atchison, 561 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, no
writ).
116. Counts v. Counts, 560 S.W.2d 186 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ).
117. See, e.g., Cress v. Jenkins, 566 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, no writ);
Peeples v. Peeples, 562 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, no writ); Bush v.
Cooley, 561 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, writ dism'd); Hanna v. Turner, 556
S.W.2d 866 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, no writ). If the court dismisses the cause
after the plaintiff has presented his case, the disposition of the case is in the posture of an
instructed verdict, and the appellate court must reverse and remand if there is any evidence
in the record that would support the plaintiffs case. See Guthrie v. Ray, 556 S.W.2d 589
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ).
118. 563 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
119. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.08 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
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day school and church. The appellate court held that this violated the
Texas Constitution.' 2
0
In 0. v. P. 12I the trial court modified custody so that the father would be
managing conservator of the son and the mother would continue as man-
aging conservator of the daughter. The mother appealed and the appellate
court held that in the absence of clear and compelling reasons children
should be raised with their brothers and sisters. The court found no such
compelling reason and reversed that portion of the judgment pertaining to
the change of managing conservatorship for the son. The court also based
its reversal on the requirements of section 14.08(c)(1) of the Family Code,
under which the person seeking to change the status quo to effect the ap-
pointment of a new managing conservator must show that " 'the retention
of the present managing conservator would be injurious to the welfare of
the child and that the appointment of a new managing conservator would
be a positive improvement for the child.' ,122 The appellate court con-
cluded that the evidence presented was insufficient to meet this heavy bur-
den.
IV. SUPPORT
The amount established for child support in the original divorce decree
provides the basis for later enforcement or modification. Generally, the
appellate court will not find an abuse of discretion in the trial courts' deter-
mination of the amount of support. 23 The appellate court, however, will
reform decrees that appear ambiguous on such matters as the date of ter-
mination of support. 24 Barring other circumstances, support terminates
when the youngest child reaches the age of majority, now eighteen
years. 25 A divorce decree may provide for access on the part of grandpar-
ents, but the grandparents may not be ordered to make monthly support
payments.'
26
Insurance policies that have been designated by divorce decrees as being
for the benefit of minor children may become payable to other benefi-
ciaries by changing the designated beneficiary, but the new beneficiary will
not be able to keep the benefits, since courts will impose constructive trusts
120. 563 S.W.2d at 317. The Texas Constitution provides: "[N]o man shall be com-
pelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry against
his consent." TEX. CONST. art. I, § 6.
121. 560 S.W.2d 122 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, no writ).
122. Id. at 126 (emphasis added).
123. See, e.g., Mosolowski v. Mosolowski, 562 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978,
no writ) (no statement of facts; therefore, no review of trial court's discretion); Delaney v.
Delaney, 562 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, writ dism'd) ($750 per
month child support affirmed); Bokhoven v. Bokhoven, 559 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Tyler 1977, no writ) ($400 per month child support for one child affirmed).
124. See Poulter v. Poulter, 565 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, no writ) ($300
per month per child support affirmed).
125. Id.; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.05 (Vernon 1975).
126. Blalock v. Blalock, 559 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, no
writ).
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to effect the provisions of the original decree.' 27 A 1978 attorney general
opinion stated that payments made by the Employees Retirement System
of Texas to minor children beneficiaries may be made directly to the par-
ent of the children without requiring the establishment of a guardian-
ship.' 28 This ruling is designed to eliminate conflicts between the Probate
Code and the Family Code and to make it easier for the surviving parent
to care for the children. The Family Code provides that parents are guard-
ians of the minor's estate and are authorized to receive payments for the
support of the child.' 29 Of course, if a guardian of the minor's estate has
already been appointed in connection with additional property in a pro-
bate proceeding, the guardian would receive the payments.
130
A valid child support order may not be modified retroactively with re-
gard to delinquent support payments.' 3' The Family Code provides for
enforcement of support orders through a court proceeding whereby the
court renders a judgment for any unpaid amount, and this judgment may
be enforced by any means available for the enforcement of judgments for
debts. 132 In Smith v. 8ramhall,'3 3 in which the collection of past due child
support from a decedent's estate was sustained, the Texas Supreme Court
noted that unpaid child support payments are not debts even though the
enforcement proceedings available under the Family Code are the same as
those for the enforcement of judgments for debts. In Houtchens v. Mat-
thews,' 34 in which a mother was suing for arrearages accumulated over an
eight-year period, the trial court erroneously applied the four-year statute
of limitations for debt rather than the ten-year statute of limitations for
judgments, and the appellate court held that the appellant was entitled to a
judgment for the full eight-year period.' 35 Since child support is not a
debt, but might be considered a judgment, this interpretation appears cor-
rect.
The importance of child support and the need for its prompt payment
was emphasized in Wailes v. Sondock, 136 a case in which the mother was
attempting to collect $4,600 in alleged child support arrearages. The father
employed as his attorney a member of the Texas House of Representatives.
Because the hearing was scheduled for January 1977, a time when the
Texas Legislature would be in session, the father's attorney asked for a
continuance until at least thirty days after May 31, 1977.'7 The trial court
granted a continuance and the mother petitioned the Texas Supreme
127. See, e.g., Gutierrez v. Madero, 564 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1978,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Roberts v. Roberts, 560 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, writ
ref d n.r.e.).
128. TEx. ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. H-1214 (1978).
129. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 12.04(4), (8) (Vernon 1975).
130. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 109 (Vernon 1956).
131. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.08(c)(2) (Vernon 1975).
132. Id. § 14.09(c).
133. 563 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. 1978).
134. 557 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, writ dism'd).
135. Id. at 585.
136. 561 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. 1977).
137. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2168a (Vernon 1964) (mandatory right to a
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Court for a writ of mandamus on the grounds that she was in "dire need of
support payments" '38 since the father had made no payments for almost
two years. The supreme court granted the writ, holding that when the
party opposing the continuance faces irreparable harm by virtue of the
mandatory legislative continuance, such a mandatory continuance violates
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States
Constitution and article I, sections 13 and 19 of the Texas Constitution.
Although there are few defenses to a judgment for back child support,
courts will prevent unjust enrichment through setoffs for payments actu-
ally made and for payments from other sources. In Block r. Waters 39 the
court pointed out that because the defendant was not before the court in a
contempt proceeding and because there was no threat to defendant's lib-
erty, his inability to pay was immaterial. To prevent unjust enrichment,
however, the court ordered the judgment reduced by the amount of any
payments actually made and of any benefits received by the children from
social security.
Amounts of judgments for support arrearages are not necessarily auto-
matic and prior court actions can be res judicata in a later suit, as occurred
in Whitley v. Whitley. 4° The couple divorced in 1970. In 1976 the wife
moved for an increase in the child support and requested that the husband
be found in contempt for failure to pay previously due support. The court
modified the support payments and found the husband in contempt, but
stayed the contempt conditioned on payment of increased support. The
court further ordered that the husband need not pay the delinquent sup-
port. This latter order was found to be res judicata in a 1977 proceeding
for a judgment for child support arrearages.' 4 ' The court noted that a
motion for contempt and a petition to reduce child support to judgment
are separate remedies and the wife should have objected to or appealed
that portion of the prior judgment that ordered the husband not to pay the
delinquent amounts.
Attempts to collect child support arrearages by garnishment of military
retirement pay have been stymied by failure to notify the husband of the
action.' 42 Apparently such garnishment will be possible if the husband is
made a party and has the opportunity to enter any defenses. Under Texas
law only retirement benefits are subject to garnishment.' 43 Further, fed-
continuance if attorney is a member of the legislature and the court proceeding coincides
with a session of the legislature).
138. 561 S.W.2d at 772.
139. 564 S.W.2d 113 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, no writ).
140. 566 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, no writ).
141. Id.
142. Breedlove v. United States Dep't of the Air Force, 569 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1978, no writ); United States v. Fleming, 565 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1978, no writ).
143. "No current wages for personal service shall ever be subject to garnishment." TEX.
CONST. art. XVI, § 28 (emphasis added). "No current wages for personal service shall be
subject to garnishment." TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4099 (Vernon 1966) (emphasis
added). See also United States v. Stelter, 567 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. 1978); Cearley v. Cearley,
544 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1976).
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eral legislation limits military benefit garnishment proceedings to actions
for child support and alimony payments.'
The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA) is a
cumbersome device for enforcing child support orders.' 45 URESA is used
when one of the parties is absent from Texas and the Texas court is with-
out personal jurisdiction over the absent party or it is inconvenient for the
absent party to come to Texas. The use of URESA may be even more
difficult when there is no underlying basis for support, as was the case in
Lewallen v. Hardin.'46 The parties had been divorced in North Carolina
and the support proceeding was initiated in North Carolina. The support
request, which was forwarded to a Texas court from North Carolina, was
based upon an affidavit stating that no support contribution had been
made and that a reasonable amount was $200 a month. The trial court's
support order was reversed and remanded on appeal on the ground that
the affidavit was merely hearsay evidence and, therefore, there was insuffi-
cient evidence on which to base the trial court order.'47 The appellate
court suggested that the needed evidence might be obtained on remand by
submitting interrogatories to the mother in North Carolina. In Exparte
McBride"' the Dallas court of civil appeals considered the enforcement in
Texas of a support decree entered in another state that has also enacted
URESA. The court held that a Texas court is without jurisdiction to use
contempt as a method of enforcement unless there has been full compli-
ance with the foreign support order enforcement procedures of the Texas
Family Code. "
During the past year numerous applications for writs of habeas corpus
were filed in connection with contempt detentions for failure to make child
support payments. Those writs based on statements of inability to pay
were usually denied because of lack of conclusive evidence.' 50 Neverthe-
less, a court cannot find a relator in contempt unless the court has jurisidic-
144. 42 U.S.C.A. § 659(a) (1978) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, effective January 1, 1975, mon-
eys . . . due from, or payable by, the United States . . . to any individual,
including members of the armed services, shall be subject, in like manner and
to the same extent as if the United States . . . were a private person, to legal
process brought for the enforcement, against such individual of his legal obli-
gations to provide child support or ma e alimony payments.
145. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 21.01-.66 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
146. 563 S.W.2d 356 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no writ).
147. "In any [URESA] hearing... the court shall be bound by the same rules of evi-
dence that bind the district court." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 21.36 (Vernon 1975). It would
appear that this section needs some modification so that the requirements would be no
greater than for a sworn account.
148. 567 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no writ).
149. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 21.61-.66 (Vernon 1975).
150. See, e.g., Exparte Lee, 568 S.W.2d 689 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1978,
no writ); Exparle Andrews, 566 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1978, no
writ); Exparte Lindsey, 561 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no writ); Exparte
Pappas, 562 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1977, no writ); Exparte Hen-
nig, 559 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ).
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tion by virtue of proper notice of a specific date for the hearing' 5 1 and a
clear, definite order with which there has not been compliance.' 52 Since
support orders must be clear and specific, they must be in writing, 153 and
since a contempt hearing is a special proceeding it is not appealable.'
5 4
In 1977 the legislature replaced the domestic relations and special juve-
nile courts with district courts of general jurisdiction called family district
courts.' 55 A question arose whether the new courts, which were really the
same courts with new numbers or names, have the power to enforce by
contempt any orders issued by the courts under their former name. The
court in Exparte West 156 concluded that the intent of the legislature was to
grant such power. Further, the new family courts must have this power of
enforcement because there is no other court presently existing that could
enforce their prior orders. A different jurisdictional issue is whether a
court that entered support orders prior to passage of the Family Code is
still the only court that can enforce its orders by contempt. An affirmative
response is mandated because the principle of continuing jurisdiction ex-
isted prior to the enactment of the Family Code. The only exception
would be the Family Code provision for modification of prior orders, not
enforcement of prior orders.'
57
An important constitutional question has still not been answered in con-
nection with incarceration for criminal contempt. In Exparte Wilson'
58
habeas corpus was requested on the basis that the relator had been de-
prived of his liberty without due process in a constructive criminal con-
tempt proceeding in which he was not represented by counsel. The court
noted that the United States Supreme Court cases cited by the relator were
persuasive, 59 but avoided the issue of lack of counsel on the basis that the
record did not show that the relator was indigent. 160 The court also noted
that there was no controlling precedent on this particular issue from either
the United States Supreme Court or the Texas Supreme Court. As a mere
intermediate court, it therefore decided not to rule on the constitutional
question and denied the writ. The Texas Supreme Court denied the peti-
tion from this ruling without opinion.' 6 ' In Exparte Hiester162 a writ of
habeas corpus was granted because the relator was able to show that his
151. Exparte Briscoe, 561 S.W.2d 26 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, no
writ).
152. See, e.g., Exparte Carpenter, 566 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1978, no writ); Exparte Deckert, 559 S.W.2d 847 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1977,
no writ); Exparle Stanford, 557 S.W.2d 346 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1977, no
writ).
5"3. Exparte Grothe, 570 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978, no writ).
154. McCoy v. Fleming, 567 S.W.2d 589 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, no writ).
155. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1926a (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
156. 559 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ).
157. Exparte Oden, 556 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App.- Dallas 1977, no writ).
158. 559 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ).
159. Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967);
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
160. 559 S.W.2d at 700.
161. 21 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 118 (Dec. 24, 1977).
162. 572 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. 1978).
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counsel's failure to appear at the contempt hearing was not the relator's
fault. The court found that the relator was deprived of his right to counsel.
Considering Wilson and Hiester together, a court might find that a relator
has a constitutional right to be represented by court appointed counsel
upon a proper showing of indigency. In Hiester the relator's failure to be
represented was caused by a failure of communication between the court
and retained counsel; nevertheless, the relator was released on the basis of
lack of representation, which was caused by no fault of his own. The ques-
tion then is whether indigency is a fault of the relator. Since indigency is
usually found not to be a fault, all indigent persons should be required to
have court appointed counsel in criminal contempt hearings.
The court rendering an original divorce decree has continuing jurisdic-
tion and can hear motions to modify that decree, unless a valid motion to
transfer is filed in the original court.' 63 This interpretation of the venue
transfer provisions of the Family Code was rendered by the Texas
Supreme Court in Cassidy v. Fuller.'64 The court held that venue in suits
affecting the parent-child relationship is required in the county where the
child has resided for more than six months. The court found that the pro-
visions are intended to be mandatory to forestall forum shopping.
Modification orders increasing child support payments must be sup-
ported by evidence demonstrating that the defendant has the financial
ability to pay the increase 165 or that there has been a material and substan-
tial change in circumstances.166 If a finding is made of a material change
in circumstances, upward modifications are permitted even if the mother is
the obligor.167 While courts should not use formulas or guidelines to de-
termine proper support amounts, they may use outside schedules for calcu-
lation purposes."' In Walsh v. Walsh 169 an unusual change in
circumstances gave rise to a lump sum child support order. Subsequent to
the divorce and original order of child support the father was involved in
an automobile accident. He was severely injured, was rendered non com-
pos mentis, and was not expected to improve. As a result of the accident
the father received a large damage judgment. The appellate court found
that the modified lump sum payment of $20,000 for one child and $10,000
for the other child was not excessive in light of the large damage award.
Reduction of support payments can be difficult without conclusive evi-
dence of inability to pay. 170 In Casterline v. Burden,17 however, the plain-
tiff did manage to introduce sufficient evidence to demonstrate the need for
reducing support payments. Plaintiffs job, at which he earned $680 per
163. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 11.04, .06 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
164. 568 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. 1978).
165. Courville v. Courville, 568 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, no writ);
Cornell v. Cornell, 570 S.W.2d 22 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, no writ).
166. Bergerac v. Maloney, 556 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ).
167. Ondrusek v. Ondrusek, 561 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, no writ).
168. Walton v. Walton, 567 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1978, no writ).
169. 558 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977, writ dism'd).
170. Barefoot v. Barefoot, 566 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, no writ).
171. 560 S.W.2d 499 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ).
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month, was terminated and he obtained a position with the estate of his
late father at only $100 per week. His motion to modify support had been
filed prior to the change in jobs and the trial court granted the reduction
retroactive to the date of the job change. On appeal, the wife argued that
back child support cannot be modified. Although the appeals court agreed
with the wife, the court noted that, as in this case, obligations that accrue
subsequent to the motion to modify may be modified; therefore, there was
no retroactive modification. 72 Casterline is interesting because apparently
more money was involved than appears in the record; however, since the
court defined income to include only the "gain which proceeds from prop-
erty, labor or business,"' 173 and not the ability to borrow, the downward
modification was correct. The court has perhaps set a dangerous precedent
in uniformly applying this definition of income to child support. Under
this definition wealth represented by holdings of non-income-producing
property such as diamonds or land would be excluded from consideration
in determining the amount of child support due.
V. TERMINATION AND ADOPTION
Custody and support determinations usually settle family disputes, but
they may also serve to set the stage for termination of the parental rights of
the noncustodial parent. Under section 15.02 of the Texas Family Code,
failure to support is one basis for the termination of a parent's right to his
child. "'74 Parents who are denied visitation rights sometimes retaliate by
withholding support. As a result, a court may find in a termination hear-
ing that lack of contact with the child combined with lack of support for
the child are sufficient grounds for termination of parental rights. Courts
are more willing to terminate parental rights when there is a plan for the
child's future, as would be the case where the custodial parent remarried
and there is a stepparent willing to adopt the child. Dress/er v. Aldridge 75
was such a case. Pursuant to a West Virginia divorce decree, the mother
was awarded custody of the two children and the father was ordered to
make child support payments. About a year after the mother remarried
she denied the father any visitation, whereupon he stopped making sup-
port payments and sought a judicial disposition of the situation by filing a
contempt proceeding in West Virginia. The suit was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction because the mother and children were no longer living in the
state. The mother, the children, and their stepfather moved to Texas in
172. "[A]n order providing for the support of a child may be modified only as to obliga-
tions accruing subsequent to the motion to modfy." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.08(c)(2)
(Vernon 1978-79) (emphasis added). The wife, however, was awarded $2,200 as a contribu-
tion toward her attorney's fees even though her attempt to prevent downward modification
was unsuccessful.
173. 560 S.W.2d at 500.
174. Termination may be granted if the court finds that the parent "failed to support the
child in accordance with his ability during a period of one year ending within six months of
the date of the filing of the petition." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.02(l)(F) (Vernon Supp.
1978-79).
175. 567 S.W.2d 48 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978, no writ).
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1972, and remained there. In 1977 the mother and the stepfather filed a
suit for termination and adoption. The father testified in the hearing that
he had difficulty locating the children after 1972, and when he phoned, he
was told he could not talk to them. He did fly to Texas in 1976 and saw
the children briefly. That meeting was his only contact with the children
prior to the hearing. No adverse findings other than failure to support
were made in relation to the father. No findings concerning the wishes of
the children were made either by the appointed guardian ad litem or the
court. In fact, the record appears devoid of any reason for termination
other than the statutory ground of failure to support. The Family Code
requirement of a showing that termination will be in the best interests of
the children 176 was weakly supported. The appellate court admitted this
was a close case and distinguished this case from Brokenleg v. Butts, 177 an
earlier case in the same court, on the basis that here the stepfather planned
to adopt the children, so that the children were assured of having legal
parents. The court alluded to the important constitutional dimension of
the parent-child relationship, 78 but nevertheless apparently grounded its
decision on the second and separate cause of action involved in this case,
adoption. It may be that for cases of this type the framers of the Texas
Family Code were correct in separating the termination proceeding from
the adoption proceeding. 179
Brokenleg v. Butts'80 involved a dispute between a South Dakota Sioux
Indian mother and Texas Anglo grandparents. The child was born of the
marriage between the son of the Anglo grandparents and the Sioux
mother. The marriage was subsequently annulled and the child remained
with the mother until the father and grandparents visited the mother on
the Rosebud Sioux Indian Reservation, at which time the mother permit-
ted the child to leave the reservation with the grandparents. The parties
disputed whether the grandparents' custody of the child was intended to be
indefinite. The natural grandparents brought an action to terminate the
parental rights of the mother and the father. The father voluntarily relin-
quished his parental rights, and these rights were terminated by the trial
court. The trial court also terminated the mother's parental rights, finding
that she left the child in the possession of another without expressing an
intent to return and without adequately supporting the child,' 8 ' and find-
ing that she failed to support the child in accordance with her ability for
one year.'82 The trial court also made the requisite finding that termina-
176. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.02(2) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79). With regard to the best
interest test, financial rights do not seem to have been stressed. There appears to have been
no consideration given to a claim for back child support. The amount must have been con-
siderable and rightfully belongs to the child, not the mother.
177. 559 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
178. 567 S.W.2d at 50.
179. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.03 (Vernon 1975), predecessor to id. § 16.03
(Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
180. 559 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
181. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.02(1)(B) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
182. See id. § 15.02(l)(F).
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tion of the mother's parental rights would be in the best interest of the
child."'83 The grandparents had not petitioned for adoption, but they were
awarded custody. Upon the mother's appeal, the appellate court reversed
in part, finding that while custody should be awarded to the grandparents,
the factors did not compel a termination of the mother's parental rights.'84
There was no evidence that the mother was unfit, and according to the
appellate court, the mother had supported the child in accordance with her
ability. Since the child expressed a desire to live with the grandparents
and the grandparents provided for the child, the court upheld the custody
award to the grandparents. In addition to the lack of a suit for adoption, it
would seem that Brokenleg is distinguishable from Dressier because the
appellant in Brokenleg was unable to support, while the appellant in
Dressier refused to support.
Saawhoff v. Wilcox 185 and In re Jones,186 two cases in which the fathers
were able to retain their parental rights, provide an interesting contrast to
the above cases. In Saathoff the father did not support the child in accord-
ance with his ability to pay. Nevertheless, the appellate court affirmed the
trial court's finding that it was not in the best interest of the child to termi-
nate the parent-child relationship, stating that the holding was not against
the weight of the evidence. In Jones the appellate court reversed the trial
court's termination of the father's parental rights because there was no evi-
dence that during a period of twelve consecutive months the father failed
to support his child in accordance with his ability. During the period in
question the father had petitioned for bankruptcy and had sustained him-
self for approximately six months on a gross income of $700 to $900. The
court took judicial notice that to pay both $100 per month child support
and to survive would be impossible on this income.
During the survey period two fathers, now serving long prison terms,
had their parental rights terminated on different grounds. The Texas Fam-
ily Code provides that a termination petition will be granted if a parent
endangers his child. 187 In Crawford v. Crawford 88 the father was found to
be unfit because he engaged in conduct that endangered the physical and
emotional well-being of his child. The appellate court affirmed, basing its
decision not only on the conduct that resulted in the imprisonment of the
father, but also on the father's violent actions during the marriage and his
letters from prison that substantiated his hostile attitude. In Belitz v.
183. See id. § 15.02(2).
184. In reversing the trial court's termination of the parent-child relationship, the appel-
late court relied on the eight factors listed in Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. I76),
for determining the best interest of the child.
185. 562 S.W.2d 18 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, no writ).
186. 566 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, no writ).
187. Termination may be granted if the court finds that the parent "engaged in conduct
or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the
physical or emotional well-being of the child." TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.02(I)(E)
(Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
188. 569 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, no writ).
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Seekatz 8 9 the court concluded that the father had not supported his child
in accordance with his ability, despite the fact that he had been in prison
since 1969. Although evidence demonstrated that prior to his imprison-
ment the father had engaged in violent conduct that might be construed as
endangering the child, the pleadings had not given him sufficient notice of
this issue. The father, however, did have sufficient notice of the issue of
support, and the court found that the father's failure to forward his excess
income earned while in prison of $10 to $15 a month to his child was an
adequate basis for termination.
In re VM.B. 19 0 illustrates that procedural difficulties and misapplica-
tions of law can prevent adjudication on the merits. An unwed father
sought legitimation of his son, whom the father had never seen, even
though he had been trying to obtain custody since before the boy's birth.
The child was conceived in Oklahoma and born in Texas in a maternity
home in 1971 where the mother relinquished her parental rights. Since the
relinquishment was prior to Stanley v. Illinois,'91 no action was taken with
regard to terminating the father's parental rights. After the boy was placed
in the home of his prospective adoptive parents, the father, a New York
domiciliary, filed suit in Oklahoma seeking to legitimate the boy and to
obtain custody. The Oklahoma court decided that New York law gov-
erned its decision, misapplied that law, did not discuss Stanley, which had
been decided prior to the Oklahoma court hearing, and denied the father
any relief. In a summary judgment ruling, the Texas court also ruled
against the father on the basis that the Oklahoma court's decision was res
judicata. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that the errors commit-
ted by the Oklahoma court could have been raised by the father when he
was seeking relief in Oklahoma.
In Nixon v. Humphrey 92 a child found to be "dependent and neglected"
was later adopted under the statutes that preceded the Family Code. 93
The mother sought by means of a bill of review to have the adoption set
aside. The mother had not been personally served in the dependency and
neglect proceeding because the former statute did not require service. 194
Nevertheless, the trial court found that this defect had been cured by per-
sonal service in the subsequent adoption proceeding. The appellate court
affirmed the trial court and dismissed summarily the mother's contention
that she was entitled to have the judgment set aside because she had been
too poor to employ counsel.
Both public and private adoption agencies occasionally use foster care.
189. 570 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, no writ).
190. 559 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
191. 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (unwed father is entitled as a matter of law to notice and hear-
ing on his fitness before his children can be taken from him).
192. 565 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
193. Any child found to be dependent and neglected could be adopted. 1969 [TEX. GEN.
LAWS] ch. 488, § 1, at 1593.
194. No service of citation was required in a dependency proceeding if the parent was
outside of the county where the proceeding was being heard. 1907 [TEX. GEN. LAWS] ch. 64,
§ 4, at 135.
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Family Code provisions concerning adoption require adoptive parents to
be scrutinized before adoption is permitted.' 95 In Chapman v. Edna
Gladney Home 196 foster parents challenged the power of the court ap-
pointed managing conservator to withhold consent to adoption. The Fam-
ily Code provides that once a managing conservator has been appointed,
he or she must consent in writing before any judgment of adoption may be
entered.' 97 The court held that the potential adoptive parents had the bur-
den to show that the home was without good cause to withhold consent.
The potential adoptive parents in Chapman failed to sustain their burden
and were not entitled to a decree of adoption. Potential adoptive or foster
parents have little standing to attack placement decisions of managing
conservators. 1
98
In matters pertaining to termination of parental rights the Texas
Supreme Court has endeavored to enforce the spirit as well as the letter of
the Family Code.' 99 The day-to-day activities of the district courts, how-
ever, are difficult to supervise since many of their decrees are interlocutory
and not appealable." Sims v. State Department of Public Welfare' indi-
cates that sections of the Family Code were used routinely in the Harris
County district courts to "stack" ten-day ex parte temporary custody or-
ders. Because no relief was afforded in the Texas courts, the appellants
turned to the federal district court which found that it was not required to
abstain and took jurisdiction.2 °2 The case represents a challenge to the
procedures allegedly used in Harris County and to the wording of some
portions of the statute. The procedure at issue deprived the parents of the
custody of their children for more than a month without a hearing or no-
tice of the specific charges.
The Sims court found several sections of the Family Code violative of
the due process rights of parents. In particular, the court struck down the
sections relating to taking possession of a child in an emergency. These
sections make no specific provision for a full adversary hearing after the
immediate emergency has passed, nor do they provide for an ex parte
hearing to discover if there is an emergency in the first place.2"3 The court
further noted that the normal procedures available in emergency suits af-
195. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 11.12, 16.031, 16.04 (Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1978-79).
196. 561 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, no writ).
197. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.05 (Vernon 1975).
198. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816
(1977).
199. See, e.g., Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. 1976); Wiley v. Spratlan, 543
S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1976).
200. See Kutzer v. Moore, 556 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, no writ)
(pleadings sought to terminate the parental rights of both natural parents, but the trial
court's judgment terminated only the rights of the mother, so that until the rights of the
father had been determined, there had been no final disposition and the mother could not
appeal).
201. 438 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D. Tex. 1977), review granted sub nom. Moore v. Sims, 47
U.S.L.W. 3291 (U.S. Oct. 30, 1978).
202. The court found that the abstention doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971), did not apply in this situation. 438 F. Supp. at 1189.
203. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 17.05 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
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fecting the parent-child relationship make possible the stacking of the pro-
visions for ex parte orders so that the children can be in the state's custody
for twenty days without a hearing.2" The court found these procedures
unacceptable and indicated that the longest time permissible without a full
hearing would be ten days from the date of seizure, not from the date
recorded on the orders.2" 5 Since there was no hearing, the standard of
proof that would have been used by the Harris County district court is
unknown. Presumably the "solid and substantial" evidence standard of
the Texas Supreme Court would be appropriate, 20 6 although the Family
Code requires only proof by a preponderance of the evidence, 2 7 and Sims
held that the proof should be clear and convincing. 208 The Sims court, in
addressing the issue of counsel for the child, also held that an attorney
should be appointed for every stage of the proceedings, including the
emergency hearing. 2 9 Additionally, and perhaps gratuitously since the is-
sue was not before it, the court discussed the provisions for the reporting
and filing of child abuse allegations, particularly those pertaining to the
materials contained in the files and on the question of their confidential-
ity.2 0 Sims ruled that these provisions were unconstitutional. The United
States Supreme Court may find that the district court's rulings are too
broad, or were not relevant to the issues before it. At the least, the Court
will probably uphold the district court's ruling on the notice and hearing
requirements of the statute.2 1 ' The standard of proof that will be applied
is uncertain. Perhaps the Court will agree with the Texas Supreme Court
that a balancing of interests between the safety of the child and the desires
of the parent is appropriate as to custody,21 2 but that clear and convincing
evidence is the minimum constitutional standard for the termination of
parental rights.21 3
The procedural questions raised by Sims are especially important since
the standards at the entry level should be strict enough to comply with due
process, but not so strict that the children are endangered. The urgent
need for proper procedures becomes more evident when one realizes that
the Texas Department of Human Resources rarely appeals a decision ad-
verse to it, and generally the Department is affirmed when it has been
victorious. Nevertheless, in Travis County Child Welfare Unit v. vance2 14
the state did appeal and won a reversal. In Vance the mother wished to
have the child placed for adoption, and both the mother and the state op-
posed the father in his attempt to legitimate the child. The trial court
204. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.1 (a)(4) (Vernon 1975).
205. 438 F. Supp. at 1193.
206. Wiley v. Spratlan, 543 S.W.2d 349, 352 (Tex. 1976).
207. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.15 (Vernon 1975).
208. 438 F. Supp. at 1194.
209. Id. at 1195.
210. Id. at 1191-92.
211. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
212. Wiley v. Spratlan, 543 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1976).
213. Id.
214. 566 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978, no writ).
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found for the father on the basis of the best interest of the child, .despite
evidence that he had never supported the child, had not seen the child nor
displayed any interest in him for more than two years after his birth, and
had no plans for creating a stable environment for the child were he to
obtain custody. The appeals court found the holding so contrary to the
weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong, and reversed and remanded.
Johnson v. Jefferson County Child We/fare Unit2" 5 is a disturbing case,
first because of the evidence of confusion of the legal meaning of a termi-
nation of parental rights in the mind of the court as well as in the minds of
social workers, and secondly because of the long delay in addressing an
alleged problem of child abuse. An involuntary termination decree must
be based on a finding of both an action prohibited by the statute and the
best interests of the child.2" 6 The prohibited action that was used as a basis
for termination of the mother's rights had occurred some thirty-five
months prior to the trial. In the interval the child lived with his mother
and grandmother and there were no allegations of any additional child
abuse. The best interest allegations were confusing since despite the
sought for termination, requiring a complete severing of all ties between
parent and child, the social workers testified that it would not be in the
best interest of the child to terminate visitation rights. The trial court com-
plied with these confusing messages by terminating parental rights one day
and granting reasonable visitation rights the next. The appellate court
found these two rulings so inconsistent as to be "mutually destructive." '217
Thus, the court concluded there was no evidence that termination would
be in the best interest of the child, and reversed and remanded, pointing
out that it could have, on the basis of a no evidence point, reversed and
rendered.
In five cases during the survey period, parents appealed the termination
of their parental rights by the trial court based upon a proceeding initiated
by the state. 1 In each case the decision was affirmed. In one case2 19 the
mother, who, if the evidence is correct, is not a "model" mother, argued
that the original petition to terminate and the hearing on appointment of a
temporary managing conservator were brought without time for her to
prepare or obtain counsel. Adequate notice was essential because the tem-
porary orders, which were interlocutory and therefore not appealable,22 °
215. 557 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, no writ).
216. Wiley v. Spratlan, 543 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1976); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.02
(Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
217. 557 S.W.2d at 571.
218. Davis v. Travis County Child Welfare Unit, 564 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. Civ. App.-Aus-
tin 1978, no writ); Lane v. Jefferson County Child Welfare Unit, 564 S.W.2d 130 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1978, writ refd n.r.e.); Coleman v. Texas State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 562
S.W.2d 554 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, writ refd n.r.e.); In re Gilmore, 559 S.W.2d 879
(Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, no writ); McGowen v. State, 558 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, no writ).
219. Coleman v. Texas State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 562 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Tyler 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).




continued for fifteen months without a final determination. The appeals
court dismissed the problem as moot, pointing out that there had been a
full and complete hearing at the time of the final determination. The
court's holding may have rested on the overwhelming evidence against the
fitness of the mother. Absent such evidence, and with a finding that termi-
nation would not be in the best interests of the child, this fifteen-month
delay might have been a serious detriment to both mother and child. The
federal court made virtually the same point in Sims v. State Department of
Public Welfare.22 Nevertheless, any changes in procedure must await ei-
ther modification of the Family Code by the legislature or a ruling of the
United States Supreme Court.
221. 438 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D. Tex. 1977), review granted sub nom. Moore v. Sims, 47
U.S.L.W. 3291 (U.S. Oct. 30, 1978); see notes 201-02 supra and accompanying text.
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